Jump to Chapters I-II
Methodological notes
This is a near clause-by-clause exploration of Aristotle’s Pre-Predicamenta of the Categories, Chapters I-IV, using the Edghill translation. I may paraphrase Aristotle’s Greek into English explication as opposed to using long verbatim quotation; in any case of this, Edghill is the translation base. In any clause where Aristotle uses a ‘technical sense,’ like “said of,” or “present in,” I will show the immediate logical consequences that he takes from those senses. Also, for ease of your own reference (and my own, really) I will use Bekker numbers wherever possible. Unless I forget, in which case, pretend I did not.
Some information may relay as similar to my brief introduction of Aristotle’s Categories as they relate to Lowe’s ontology in this article.
Chapter I
Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms (1a1-1a16)
Aristotle begins not by giving his list of ten categories instantly, but by clarifying how names relate to what it is that they are naming; the Categories is about what may be predicated and about how language identifies kinds of things. The first chapter specifies Aristotle’s three ways that expressions may relate to their referents: equivocal (homonymous), univocal (synonymous / “same-meaning”), and derivative (paronymous / denominative) (1a1-1a16).
i. Homonymy (equivocity)
Things are called ‘equivocally named’ when a shared name is attached but the definition corresponding to that name for each cause. The example given by Aristotle is: an actual living man and a figure of a man in a “picture” can both be called “animal” but in different senses. So, we can say that homonymous predication does not give a single unified definition that applies to both items (1a1-1a5).
What is important to remember is that when Aristotle speaks of homonymy, he is isolating cases wherein the name is the same but the defining account is different; this makes such cases useless for classificatory predication if one is looking for a single explanatory definition. Scholars often stress that Aristotle’s concern is of semantic or ontological clarity, where, if a predicate is homonymous, it cannot also serve as a stable genus for classification.
ii. Synonymy (univocity; “same meaning”)
Names are univocal when the name is common and the corresponding definition is the same across instances—for example, “man” as applied to each human being has one definition that is appropriate to all. This is the sense Aristotle later uses when he has a need for predicates that can genuinely be said of a subject in a classificatory genus way (1a6-1a9).
Later, univocity becomes a precondition for Aristotle’s claim that predicates “said of” subjects are part of a hierarchical tree. Only univocal predicates are able to support the transitivity of classificatory predication.
iii. Paronymy (derivatives / denominatives)
A derivative name is one formed from another word, or, one that has its origins in another substantive. For Aristotle, this includes denominatives (that is, names formed from verbs or qualities) and adjectival derivatives, like “courageous.” Their logic is that the derivative’s meaning is parasitic on some primary signification (1a13-1a16).
Why start with Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms
By getting his linguistic relations and efforts in order, Aristotle prepares his own footing for his later work. The Categories works with predicates that must be used in univocal ways if one intends to create an inventory of what can truly be said; the antecedent semantic taxonomy prevents the conflation of different uses of the same word when Aristotle creates his ontological lists.
Chapter II
Simple & Composite Expressions; the “four-fold” distinction (1a20-1b9)
The opening distinction of Chapter II is between forms of speech that are simple (single words without composition: e.g., “man,” “white,” or “runs”) from composite expressions (full statements like “the man runs,” which can both have structure and be either true or false).
Only composite expressions (that is, propositions) can be true or false. Understanding this is important, because Categories is not about truth-bearing composites, propositions, but about the basic types of simple terms that can function as either predicates or subjects within those propositions. It is a much more basic, ‘down-up’ work. Our focus here is only on simple expressions (1a20-1a24).
Now, we have the two crucial ontological or semantic relations of “said of” and “present in,” which will later cross over to create that aforementioned four-fold division.
i. Semantic relation of SAID OF
Said of (katēgoroumenon / predicable of) is, in essence, the relation of a universal to what falls under it. For example, “man” is said of Socrates, the particular; the relation of the universal man to the particular Socrates is the said-of in this example.
ii. Semantic relation of PRESENT IN
Conversely, present-in (en hupokeimenōi / present-in a subject) is the relation of an accident or dependent item to the substance in which it inheres. When we talk of “accidents,” it is not an accident like tripping over your own feet. In Aristotelian philosophy, an accident refers to a property of a thing that is not essential to its nature. Like its colour, or movement, which can both change, according to Aristotle, without altering the thing’s identity.
So, present-in is the relation of this non-essential property, the accident, to the substance in which it inheres. For example, the “whiteness” of Socrates; the particular whiteness of Socrates is present-in the particular Socrates’s body.
Important note on present-in
Aristotle explicitly warns that present-in a subject is not the relation of part to whole. So, present in does not mean that one thing is physically part of another, like a wheel is part of a chariot. It only described a kind of ontological dependence; something is present-in a subject if it exists only by being instantiated in that subject and cannot exist independently.
In the example “the particular whiteness of Socrates” for something being present-in, we can observe this, as this particular whiteness of Socrates cannot exist without being instantiated in Socrates, as if it did, it would no longer be that particular whiteness, but another sort of whiteness.
iii. The four-fold division
The four-fold division details how said-of and present-in cross. This is not laid out by Aristotle himself, the Aristotelian distinction between said-of and present-in lead, naturally, to a four-fold classification of beings. We can see this process of discernment through the following:
1. Beings that are said-of others correspond to universals, since they can be predicated of multiple subjects.
2. Beings that are not said-of others are particulars, as they cannot be predicated of anything else.
3. Beings that are present-in others are accidental, since they exist only in a subject and are not essential to the subject’s identity.
4. Beings that are not present-in others are non-accidental, since they exist independently and are not ontologically dependent on a subject.
From here, we can naturally yield four classes:
a. Accidental universals (said-of & present-in)
b. Essential universals (said-of & not present-in)
c. Accidental particulars (not said-of & present-in)
d. Non-accidental particulars (not said-of & not present-in) → primary substances
Primary substances (non-accidental particulars / not said-of and not present-in)
Of the four classes, that which is not said-of and not present-in would, undoubtedly and assuredly, be the favourite child of Aristotle. Aristotle calls them primary substances, for they are non-accidental (present-in) but they are also not universal (said-of). They pertain to only one particular thing. Some examples would include Bucephalus or Socrates (1a20-2a11).
These primary substances are particulars that exist independently and are not ontologically dependent on any other entity; however, do not mistake this for metaphysical necessity—they are not necessary in that sense.
These substances are not contingent temporal manifestations of things, such as Sirius, and Sirius is currently riding a horse, so that being is Sirius-riding-a-horse—this is not the primary substance. Sirius himself is the primary substance since he is the essential being.
Since they are not said-of anything, they cannot be predicated of other entities; they are the subjects of predication. Aristotle only ever talks about primary substances in relation to what they are not, so by the negative; neo-Aristotelian scholarship is concerned with discussing primary substances in the positive. All other beings bear some form of asymmetric dependence on primary substances (2a34-2b6).
Accidental particulars (not said-of and present-in)
Entities that are not said-of anything but are present-in a subject are known as accidental particulars; for instance, an individual piece of knowledge (1a25) or the particular whiteness I mentioned earlier (of Socrates). They are accidental since they depend upon the substance they are instantiated it for their existence, but particular since they would not be the same entity without that instantiation.
In contemporary metaphysics, some might call these entities “tropes.” They are particularised properties. However, do not confuse Aristotle’s ontology from contemporary trope-theory! What is interesting about accidental particulars for Aristotle is that they demonstrate how particulars are not all substances; and, further, how things depend on primary substances for their instantiation/existence.
Essential universals (said-of and not present-in / secondary substances)
We may call essential universals secondary substances. One example would be a “man,” which is a universal within the category of substance (1a21).
The reason as to why we may call them secondary substances is for the fact that they capture the essential characteristics of primary substances. They are the kinds to which particular substances belong. For example, the primary substance Socrates instantiate the universal “man,” which is the secondary substance. It is not accidental, as it defines what it is to be a member of that kind.
Accidental universals (said-of and present-in)
When entities are both said-of and present-in a primary substance, they are accidental universals. These are the universals that inhere in primary substances, but are not essential to them, like the whiteness.
Accidental universes are predicable of multiple subjects but do not define their essential nature. Continuing with the whiteness, it is a universal property that is instantiated within the primary (of that, “white”) but it is not what makes Socrates what he is.